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While software patents and patent trolls dominate most patent discussions, 
the Supreme Court has focused on patents in the biotechnology and pharmaceu-
tical space. In addition to deciding a number of antitrust cases involving such 
patents,
1
 the Court has in the last two Terms decided two cases involving the 
subject matter eligibility of biopharmaceutical patent claims. In June 2013, the 
Court handed down a unanimous decision on DNA patenting, Association for 
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.
2
 The Court’s decision in Myriad 
came on the heels of its unanimous decision a year earlier in Mayo Collabora-
tive Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.
3
 
In both Mayo and Myriad, the Court struck down patent claims associated 
with diagnostic medical practice. Mayo rejected method claims on measuring a 
thiopurine drug metabolite to adjust doses of a thiopurine drug. Myriad rejected 
claims to DNA that has merely been isolated (genomic DNA or gDNA)—such 
claims are typically associated with diagnostic medicine. 
The Court’s recent interest in diagnostic medicine patents comes after 
many years of heated public controversy over whether such patents pose an  
undue impediment to patient access as well as patient and physician autonomy. 
Notably, however, the policy analysis in Mayo and Myriad focuses on innova-
tion. That focus is appropriate. Although access and autonomy are important 
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goals, patent validity doctrines are a very blunt mechanism for promoting them. 
Antitrust lawaggressive insurer bargaining over price and other conditions of 
access, and proposals for various infringement exemptions offer more tailored 
solutions.   
While the Supreme Court’s opinions rightly focus on innovation, they fall 
short in their efforts to prescribe how patent eligibility can be used to promote 
innovation goals. Critics have bemoaned the uncertainty created by the Court’s 
decisions.
4
 The Mayo case in particular has prompted justifiable concern that its 
resuscitation of old, and long-criticized, approaches to subject matter eligibility 
will undermine the promise of personalized medicine.
5
 Against this background 
of negative reaction, I sketch a path forward for how Mayo and Myriad could 
be read through an innovation-focused lens.  
 
INNOVATION AND THE COURT’S DECISIONS 
 
Although the patent statute does not speak to the question,the Court has 
long held as a matter of common law that “abstract ideas,” “laws of nature,” 
and “products of nature” fall outside the realm of patent eligibility. On the other 
hand, the Court has also repeatedly warned (including in the Mayo case) that 
these categorical exemptions must be carefully deployed, since all inventions 
canbe  
reduced to principles of nature.
6
 The Court therefore has the responsibility to 
articulate clearly how far its excluded categories extend, and equally important, 
why the categories are off limits.    
In this regard, portions of the Mayo decision are quite problematic. The 
Mayo Court held that the claims at issue were invalid because they added only 
conventional activity to the natural law that individuals metabolize thiopurine 
drugs differently. In reaching this conclusion, the Mayo Court resuscitated a 
much-criticized 1978 case, Parker v. Flook,
7
 in which the Court had, for pur-
poses of determining patent eligibility, dissected out the patent-ineligible “ab-
stract idea” and then determined whether what remained was novel. The Mayo 
Court suggested the continuing viability of this “point of novelty” approach 
even though a 1981 case, Diamond v. Diehr,
8
 had disparaged the approach. 
Fortunately, the result in Myriad could be seen as walking back this part of 
the Mayo case. Although the Myriad Court rejected gDNA claims, it affirmed 
claims to DNA with regions that don’t code for a protein excised. Notably, this 
complementary or cDNA represents nothing more than the conventional appli-
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6. Mayo, 133 S. Ct. at 1304. 
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cation of routine laboratory techniques to a product of nature—chromosomal 
DNA.  
Additionally, other portions of the Mayo opinion are more promising. 
Throughout the opinion, the Court did allude to policy considerations, most  
notably the possibility that claims on laws of nature, even claims that satisfied 
all requirements of patentability other than subject matter, could unduly 
“preempt” future research. In this context, it recognized arguments made by the 
patentee and by various academics
9
 regarding the importance of distinguishing 
broad laws that interfere with large areas of future innovation from narrower 
laws. After recognizing these arguments, the Court further acknowledged that 
the law of nature it was addressing—that individuals metabolize thiopurine-
containing drugs differently—was in fact quite narrow. Unfortunately, the 
Court did not follow through on the promise of its reasoning. Instead, the Court 
insisted that it needed to enunciate a “bright-line prohibition” striking down all 
patents covering laws of nature, no matter how narrow.
10
  
The patents affected by Mayo could include many that relate to the  
burgeoning field of personalized medicine. Personalized medicine revolves 
around “natural” associations between biomarkers such as DNA variations and 
patient prognosis or drug response. Like the association at issue in Mayo, per-
sonalized medicine associations typically cover narrow laws of nature. Unlike 
the association in Mayo, however, some of these associations may be quite dif-
ficult to find and validate clinically.
11
 Although the Food and Drug Administra-
tion does not currently require such clinical validation in all cases, insurers are, 
quite justifiably, increasingly requiring validation.
12
 Patents may be necessary 
to induce development of relevant evidence. On its face, then, Mayo’s reason-
ing is in tension with an economically oriented approach.  
From the standpoint of those who care about innovation policy, all is not 
lost, however. In the context of conceding that the law of nature in question 
was narrow, the Mayo Court did emphasize the relatively trivial contribution 
made by the patentee. According to the Court, studies had already indicated 
that measurement of thiopurine metabolite level was important for predictions 
of efficacy.
13
 The patentee had simply quantified the precise correlation  
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13. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1295. 
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between metabolite levels and effectiveness. In contrast, certain advances in 
personalized medicine—for example, the development of tests that analyze the 
expression of multiple genes in a tumor sample as a guide to prognosis and  
future treatment—could be distinguished as much more complex than the  
simple laboratory test in Mayo. In other words, all diagnostic associations are 
not alike, and perhaps the reasoning in Mayo can be restricted to the simple 
category.   
As with Mayo, portions of the Myriad decision are quite promising. In that 
case, which involved claims to two genes, BRCA1 and BRCA2, determined to 
be associated with breast cancer, the Court made the acute observation that 
Myriad’s claims were deliberately drawn to be very difficult to invent around. 
Myriad claimed not “the specific chemical composition of a particular mole-
cule” but, instead, the information “encoded in the BRCA1 and BRCA2 
genes.”
14
   
To be sure, the Court did uphold Myriad’s cDNA claims, even though it 
viewed those as drawn to information as well. Moreover, the Court failed to 
enunciate why claims to information in the form of cDNA are less problematic 
than claims to information in the form of gDNA. This failure renders the opin-
ion’s own language much less useful to lower courts struggling to distinguish 
between different types of claims to information. Claims to information arise 
not only in the context of DNA and bioinformatics, but also in all contexts 
where data processing plays a major role. The Court could therefore have pro-
vided a blueprint not simply for the biopharmaceutical industry, but also to the 
many industries dependent on software. Myriad therefore represents a missed 
opportunity. 
Nonetheless, lower courts could certainly read the Court’s distinction be-
tween cDNA and gDNA through the economic lens invoked by the two amicus 
briefs that called the distinction to the attention of the Court—that of the Solici-
tor General and of the prominent geneticist Eric Lander.
15
 Both of these briefs 
emphasized that while gDNA claims could interfere with a broad range of 
downstream uses, cDNA claims had narrower application specific to thera-
peutic development and could be worked around for other purposes. Although 
patent lawyers typically view breadth as an issue to be addressed by sections of 
the patent statute other than section 101, in certain cases (including the case of 
some of the gDNA claims at issue in the Myriad case), these sections may not  
do the job as efficiently as section 101. 
With gDNA patents now out of the picture, concerns that the platform 
technology of whole genome sequencing could be impeded by such patents are 
gone. Although some had argued that these patents would not have posed a ma-
 
14. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2118 
(2013). 
15. See Brief for Amicus Curiae Eric S. Lander in Support of Neither Party, Myriad, 
133 S. Ct. 2107 (No. 12-398), 2013 WL 432959; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curi-
ae in Support of Neither Party, Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (No. 12-398), 2013 WL 
390999. 
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jor obstacle,
16
 dissipating the shadow of infringement liability to the greatest 
extent possible was important for officials at the National Institutes of Health 
(NIH) and the U.S. Office of Science and Technology Policy. They successful-
ly convinced the Solicitor General to reject the U.S. Patent and Trademark Of-
fice’s long-held, but only lightly theorized, position of allowing claims on all 
“isolated” DNA molecules.  
As it happens, NIH has a long history of helping to shape validity require-
ments in the context of DNA patents.
17
 NIH played that role again in the Myri-
ad case. As with many areas of law, patent law in the area of DNA has been an 
example of “shared regulatory space.”
18
 
 The day the opinion was announced, a number of firms stated that they 
would begin commercial testing for BRCA1 and BRCA2 mutations. Relying 
primarily on patents with method claims that have not thus far been chal-
lenged,
19
 Myriad has now sued two firms, Ambry Genetics and Gene-by-
Gene.
20
 The question of whether these method claims survive Mayo is an inter-
esting one. Under the approach advanced here, these method claims should fail 
on patent eligibility grounds if they inevitably block broad areas of future  
research. For example, to the extent that Myriad’s interpretation of its remain-
ing claims would cover all whole exome sequencing (whole exome sequencing 
is similar to whole genome sequencing except that introns are not sequenced), 
such an  interpretation should call into question patent eligibility under section 
101.  
Although Myriad has sued several firms, it has also formally announced for 
the first time that it will not sue noncommercial academic researchers.
21
 NIH, 
which funded a substantial portion of the research that led to Myriad’s patents, 
could play a role in ensuring that promise is kept. NIH is a co-owner of certain 
patents that Myriad is currently asserting,
22
 and it may have funded research 
underlying some of the other patents. Both the terms of NIH co-ownership and 
the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, under which government agencies have back-
ground rights in patents emerging from research they fund,
23
 give NIH some 
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leverage. Because U.S. patent law unfortunately lacks the type of formal  
research-use exemption that exists in many other countries, NIH’s role in pro-




 For many in the biopharmaceutical industry, the concern raised by Myriad 
is not invalidation of gDNA patents, but instead unintended consequences for 
patents associated with therapeutic molecules. All therapeutic molecules  
require approval by the FDA, and most analysts agree that patents provide  
important incentives for expending the resources necessary to secure such  
approval.
24
 The amicus briefs filed by the Solicitor General and Eric Lander 
specifically called for upholding cDNA claims typically associated with thera-
peutics.  
Therapeutic products that could be affected include proteins and antibod-
ies. Although many protein and antibody patents now claim molecules to which 
the “chemical changes” favored by the Myriad Court have been made, certain 
claims could be seen as encompassing naturally occurring molecules. Even in 
these cases, however, the claims wouldn’t necessarily be invalid. Even when 
chemical changes are not claimed, the antibodies and proteins are nonetheless 
probably claimed as something closer to “specific chemical compositions” than 
to information. Lower courts could focus on this aspect of the Myriad opinion 
in upholding such claims. Similarly, in addressing patents covering small mole-
cule chemicals with important therapeutic uses that have been isolated from  
nature,
25
 courts could focus on the fact that these patents narrowly claim “spe-




Without a doubt, the Court’s recent spate of activity in the area of patent 
eligibility and diagnostic patenting has caused considerable anxiety for those 
concerned about innovation. Ideally, the question of subject matter eligibility 
would have been addressed more fully decades earlier. At least on the reading 
advanced here, however, the Court’s opinions may not pose the barrier to inno-




24. That said, most protein and antibody therapeutics now enjoy a twelve-year period of 
regulatory protection from generic competition by virtue of the Biologics Price Competition 
and Innovation Act (incorporated as Title VII of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act). This regulatory exclusivity may provide an incentive at least as  
important as patent protection.   
25. Many such molecules are listed in an amicus brief field by the Biotechnology Indus-
try Organization. Brief for Amicus Curiae the Biotechnology Indus. Org. in Support of Re-
spondents at 26-28, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 
(2013) (No. 12-398), 2013 WL 1209142.  
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